Cold War (1985–1991)

Cold War (1985–1991)
Part of the Cold War

The 1991 signing of the Belovezha Accords, which effectively dissolved the Soviet Union and ended the Cold War
Date19851991
Location
Result Western Bloc victory
Belligerents
1985–1989
Western Bloc:
Allied states
Allied organisations
Anti-Soviet socialist states
1985–1989
Eastern Bloc:
1989–1991
Western Bloc:
Allied states
1989–1991
Eastern Bloc:
Allied states
1989–1991
Other socialist states
Commanders and leaders
1985–1989
United States Ronald Reagan
United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher China Deng Xiaoping
1985–1989
Soviet Union Konstantin Chernenko
Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev
1989–1991
United States George H. W. Bush
United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher
United Kingdom John Major
1989–1991
Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev
1989–1991
China Deng Xiaoping
China Li Peng

The time period of around 1985–1991 marked the final period of the Cold War. It was characterized by systemic reform within the Soviet Union, the easing of geopolitical tensions between the Soviet-led bloc and the United States-led bloc, the collapse of the Soviet Union's influence in Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

World map of communist and socialist countries in 1985

The beginning of this period is marked by the ascent of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Seeking to bring an end to the economic stagnation associated with the Brezhnev Era, Gorbachev initiated economic reforms (perestroika), and political liberalization (glasnost). While the exact end date of the Cold War is debated among historians, it is generally agreed upon that the implementation of nuclear and conventional arms control agreements, the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War.

Thaw in relations

[edit]

After the deaths of three successive elderly Soviet leaders since 1982, the Soviet Politburo elected Gorbachev Communist Party General Secretary in March 1985, marking the rise of a new generation of leadership.[1] Under Gorbachev, relatively young reform-oriented technocrats, who had begun their careers in the heyday of "de-Stalinization" under reformist leader Nikita Khrushchev,[a] rapidly consolidated power, providing new momentum for political and economic liberalization, and the impetus for cultivating warmer relations via glasnost and trade with the West.[3]

Reagan and Gorbachev during their first summit meeting in Geneva, 1985

On the Western front, President Reagan's administration had taken a hard line against the Soviet Union. Under the Reagan Doctrine, the Reagan administration began providing military support to anti-communist armed movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and elsewhere.[4] Reagan had also ordered the implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983—a space-based interceptor program against nuclear missiles more commonly dubbed "Star Wars" by the media—an initiative that alarmed and "horrified the Soviets," who while doubting its feasibility, were in no position to compete technologically.[5] By November 1985, the Soviets perceived SDI as both a military threat and as a potential means by which the United States might weaken NATO cohesion and alter the strategic balance in nuclear weapon technology.[6] At the same time, officials in the Kremlin expressed concern that the deployment of space-based missile defenses would destabilize strategic parity and could make nuclear war more likely rather than less.[7]

A major breakthrough came in 1985–87, with the successful negotiation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).[8] The INF Treaty of December 1987, signed by Reagan and Gorbachev, eliminated all nuclear and conventional missiles, as well as their launchers, with ranges of 500–1,000 kilometres (310–620 mi) (short-range) and 1,000–5,500 kilometres (620–3,420 mi) (intermediate-range).[b] The treaty did not cover sea-launched missiles. By May 1991, after on-site investigations by both sides, 2,700 missiles had been destroyed.[9][10]

The Reagan administration also persuaded the Saudi Arabian oil companies to increase oil production. This led to a three-times drop in the prices of oil, and oil was the main source of Soviet export revenues.[11] Following the USSR's previous large military buildup, President Reagan ordered an enormous peacetime defense buildup of the United States Armed Forces; the Soviets did not respond to this by building up their military because the military expenses, in combination with collectivized agriculture in the nation, and inefficient planned manufacturing, would cause a heavy burden for the Soviet economy. It was already stagnant and in a poor state prior to the tenure of Mikhail Gorbachev who, despite significant attempts at reform, was unable to revitalise the economy.[12] Recognizing the unsustainable burden of military spending on the Soviet GDP, the growing costs of sustaining allied and satellite regimes, systemic barriers to technological innovation, and declining domestic living standards, Gorbachev pursued a program of radical economic modernization.[13] The implications of these combined factors were vast, leading Gorbachev to begin changing the regime's political tone.[13]

In 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev held their first of four "summit" meetings, beginning in Geneva, Switzerland.[14] After discussing policy, facts, etc., Reagan invited Gorbachev to go with him to a small house near the beach. The two leaders spoke in that house well over their time limit, but came out with the news that they had planned two more (soon three more) summits.[15] The second summit took place the following year, in 1986 on October 11, in Reykjavík, Iceland.[14] The meeting was held to pursue discussions about scaling back their intermediate-range ballistic missile arsenals in Europe.[16] The talks came close to achieving an overall breakthrough on nuclear arms control, but ended in failure due to Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative and Gorbachev's proposed cancellation of it.[17]

Fundamental to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Gorbachev policy initiatives of Restructuring (Perestroika) and Openness (Glasnost) had ripple effects throughout the Soviet world, including eventually making it impossible to reassert central control over Warsaw Pact member states without resorting to military force.[18]

United States President Ronald Reagan delivers a speech at the Berlin Wall in June 1987, in which he called for Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to "Tear Down This Wall!".[19] Famous passage begins at 11:10 into this video.

By 1986–1987, the Reagan administration increasingly employed public rhetorical challenges that emphasized human rights and political choice as tests of Soviet reform, during which the American president used a symbolic address to gauge the credibility of Gorbachev's agenda.[20] The most overt example occurred when Reagan challenged Gorbachev on June 12, 1987 to go further with his reforms and democratization by tearing down the Berlin Wall.[21] In a speech at the Brandenburg Gate next to the wall, Reagan stated:

General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union, Central and South-East Europe, if you seek liberalization, come here to this gate; Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall![22]

While the aging communist European leaders kept their states in the grip of "normalization", Gorbachev's reformist policies in the Soviet Union exposed how a once revolutionary Communist Party of the Soviet Union had become moribund at the very center of the system. Facing declining revenues due to declining oil prices and rising expenditures related to the arms race and the command economy, the Soviet Union was forced during the 1980s to take on significant amounts of debt from the Western banking sector.[23] The socio-political effects of the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine increased public support for these policies.[24] By the spring of 1989—in the wake of growing public disapproval of the Soviet–Afghan War—the USSR had not only experienced lively media debate, but had also held its first multi-candidate elections. For the first time in recent history, the force of liberalization was spreading from West to East.[25]

Revolt spreads through Communist Europe

[edit]
The Pan-European Picnic took place in August 1989 on the Hungarian-Austrian border.

Grassroots organizations, such as Poland's Solidarity movement, rapidly gained ground with strong popular bases that included organized labor, intellectual networks, and support from the Catholic Church.[26] Historian John Lewis Gaddis claims that Solidarity survived repression because it embodied a distinctive national identity that communist authorities were unable to suppress, while economic stagnation increasingly discredited the ruling party's ideology.[27] In February 1989 the Polish People's Republic opened talks with opposition, known as the Polish Round Table Agreement, which allowed elections with participation of anti-Communist parties in June 1989.[28] These negotiations legalized Solidarity and established the framework for partially free parliamentary elections, which facilitated sweeping victory for opposition candidates and effectively ended communist rule in Poland.[29]

Events in Poland were soon followed by developments in Hungary, where reformist leaders dismantled border controls with Austria during the summer of 1989.[30] An opening of a border gate once part of the Iron Curtain between Austria and Hungary triggered a chain reaction, at the end of which the German Democratic Republic no longer existed and the Eastern Bloc had disintegrated—incentivized at least in part by the absence of Soviet intervention. The idea for the Pan-European Picnic came from Otto von Habsburg and was intended as a test of whether the Soviet Union would react when the iron curtain was opened. The Pan-European Union Austria then advertised with leaflets in Hungary to make East Germans aware of the possibility of escape. The result was the greatest mass exodus since the building of the Berlin Wall and the non-reaction of the Eastern bloc states showed the oppressed population that their governments had lost absolute power.[31]

Subsequently, large numbers of East German refugees attempted to flee through Hungary and the weak reactions showed that the communist leaders lost even more power, which also contributed directly to the collapse of communist rule in East Germany.[32][33][c] By mid-1989 even Soviet officials openly joked that Eastern European states would now be allowed to proceed in their own way (like Sinatra), signaling the end of enforced ideological conformity within the bloc.[34]

Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, communist regimes fell with varying degrees of violence.[35] In Czechoslovakia and East Germany, mass demonstrations forced long-entrenched party leaderships from power, while in Romania the collapse of Nicolae Ceaușescu's regime occurred through a violent uprising in December 1989.[36] Also in 1989 the Communist government in Hungary started organizing competitive elections. The Communist regimes in Bulgaria and Romania also crumbled, in the latter case as the result of a violent uprising among a host of additional socio-political ruptures in former Soviet-satellite states.[37] Attitudes had changed enough that US Secretary of State James Baker suggested that the American government would not be opposed to Soviet intervention in Romania, on behalf of the opposition, to prevent bloodshed.[38] The tidal wave of change culminated with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which symbolized the collapse of European Communist governments and dramatically eroded the Iron Curtain divide of Europe.[39]

The collapse of the Eastern European governments with Gorbachev's tacit consent inadvertently encouraged several Soviet republics to seek greater independence from Moscow's rule.[40] Agitation for independence in the Baltic states led to first Lithuania, and then Estonia and Latvia, declaring their independence. Disaffection in the other republics was met by promises of greater decentralization.[41] More open elections led to the election of candidates opposed to Communist Party rule, but it also contributed to party fragmentation and presidentialism, which complicated democratic transition.[42]

In an attempt to halt the rapid changes to the system, a group of Soviet hard-liners represented by Vice-president Gennady Yanayev launched a coup overthrowing Gorbachev in August 1991.[43] The coup collapsed after mass public resistance in Moscow and the refusal of key military units to support the plotters, while Yeltsin emerged as the principal defender of constitutional authority.[44]. On December 1, Ukraine withdrew from the USSR as an independent state.[45] On 26 December 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics officially ceased to exist and subsequently dissolved into fifteen independent states; this formally ended the Cold War international system.[46]

End of the Cold War

[edit]

After the end of the Revolutions of 1989, Gorbachev and President Bush Sr. met on the neutral island of Malta to discuss the events of the year, the withdrawal of the Soviet military from Eastern Europe, and the future course of their relationship.[47] After their discussions, the two leaders publicly announced they would work together for German reunification,[48] the normalization of relations, the resolution of Third World conflicts, and the promotion of peace and democracy (referred to by President Bush as a "New World Order").[49][50]

Between the Malta Summit and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union, negotiations on several arms control pacts began, resulting in agreements such as START I and the Chemical Weapons Convention;[51] the latter taking several years to fully implement.[52] Additionally, the United States, still believing the Soviet Union would continue to exist in the long term, began to take steps to create a positive long-term relationship. This new relationship was demonstrated by the joint American-Soviet opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The Soviet Union voted in the United Nations Security Council in favor of Resolution 678 authorizing the use of military force against its former Middle Eastern ally.[53][54]

During the late 1980s, several long-running conflicts in the developing world that had been sustained by Cold War rivalry began to wind down, including wars in Cambodia, Angola, Nicaragua).[55] As relations between Washington and Moscow improved, both governments increasingly worked to restrain their respective regional allies—pressuring their respective proxies to make peace with one another—and establish negotiated settlements instead, while the US concomitantly stressed market globalization.[56] In southern Africa, Soviet and Cuban support for the Angolan government diminished as diplomacy advanced, while the United States reduced backing for anti-communist insurgents, enabling peace processes that culminated in the late 1980s.[57] Overall, this détente which accompanied the final twilight of the Cold War would help bring about a relatively more peaceful international environment.[58][59]

As a consequence of the Revolutions of 1989 and the adoption of a foreign policy based on non-interference by the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact rapidly lost its political and military rationale and began dissolving.[60] Meanwhile, Soviet troops once stationed across eastern Europe began returning to the Soviet Union, completing their withdrawal by the mid-1990s.[61][62] In the early 1990s, Soviet troop strength in its former satellites was greatly diminished and the final withdrawals were completed by the mid-1990s, marking the end of the Soviet military presence that had defined the Cold War order in Europe since 1945.[63][64]

For all the complexity and geopolitical strain the great power competition of the Cold War brought onto Europe during the second half of the 20th century, its trajectory turned out to be both "more prosperous and peaceful for Europeans than the first," so quips German historian Konrad Jarausch.[65] These social and economic realities do not, however, diminish the fact that the Cold War was a "multi-dimensional struggle" that left physical remnants across Europe, from "missile silos, tank tracks, command bunkers, and troop barracks" to the stockpiling of nuclear armaments capable of destroying the entire planet.[66] Jarausch adds that:

Fortunately, the deadliness of the weapons proved therefore self-limiting and turned the Cold War into a peaceful competition between modernization alternatives. In Europe, the nuclear standoff stabilized frontiers, leading to a mutual recognition of spheres of influence that excluded the resort to arms in advancing social revolution or rolling back communism.[67]

Perhaps coupled with the hysteria, fears, and moral repugnance Reagan associated with "mutually assured destruction"[5] the end of the Cold War eventually stemmed from a convergence of leadership and policy shifts. While the U.S. military buildup increased the costs of confrontation, Reagan’s turn toward cooperation helped reduce superpower tensions. European leaders consistently pressed for arms reduction, but the decisive change came with Gorbachev's post-Brezhnev leadership.[68] His reforms, withdrawal from Afghanistan, and vision of a "common European home" signaled a new global commitment to disarmament. The abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine then enabled reform within the Eastern bloc, empowered dissent and ultimately facilitated the Cold War's end.[68] With its end, a more peaceful future awaited Europe and the world alike.[69]

Post–Cold War foreign policy uncertainty in the United States

[edit]

By the early 1990s, the United States had developed a complex global presence but lacked a shared framework for defining post–Cold War threats, interests, and priorities. Policymakers debated whether American leadership should emphasize restraint, engagement, or continued global activism, causing many to criticize the period's self-indulgence, attempts to reorganize the Islamic world, and the failure to integrate the former Soviet Union into NATO.[70] The United States had established a complex global presence by the 1990s and policymakers felt that some structure to explain the "threats, interests and priories" that guide foreign policy was needed, but there was no agreement on how to proceed. Anthony Lake has said that attempts at doctrine-making during this period risked introducing "neo-know-nothing" isolationism or what he termed "irrational" ideas.[71] The goal then of Bush Sr. and Clinton during their terms in office was to develop foreign policy objectives that would support consensus rather than accelerate fragmentation inside America's sphere of influence, ideological confrontation, or rigid doctrine building.[72]

Causes

[edit]

Scholars have pointed to materialist and ideational reasons for the end of the Cold War.[73] Materialists emphasize Soviet economic difficulties (such as economic stagnation and sovereign debt),[74] whereas ideationalists argue that the worldviews and personas of Gorbachev and Reagan mattered.[75] Ideationalists point to a Gorbachev and Reagan's mutual desire to abolish nuclear weapons,[76] as well as Gorbachev's perceptions of foreign policy.[77] To this end, Gorbachev's reconceptualization of security—emphasizing mutual restraint, political choice, and non-coercion—proved central to ending the Cold War.[78]

Legacy

[edit]

People living through the post–Cold War period witnessed rapid economic transformation and political integration in much of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in states that later joined the European Union and NATO.[79] At the same time, parts of the former Soviet Union experienced severe economic dislocation, declining living standards, and sharp reductions in life expectancy during the transition to market economies.[80] Countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia experienced economic reconstruction, growth and fast integration with EU and NATO,[81][82] while some of their eastern neighbors created hybrids of free market oligarchy system, post-communist corrupted administration and dictatorship.[83]

Russia and some other Soviet successor states faced a chaotic and harsh transition from a command economy to free market capitalism following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.[84] A large percentage of the population lived in poverty, GDP growth declined, and life expectancy dropped sharply. Living conditions also declined in some other parts of the former Eastern bloc.[85]

Soviet general secretary Gorbachev and U.S. president Reagan signing the INF Treaty, 1987

The post–Cold War era was marked by sustained economic prosperity in much of the Western world, particularly in the United States, alongside a broad wave of democratization across Latin America, Africa, and Central, South-East, and Eastern Europe.[86]

Sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein expresses a less triumphalist view, arguing that the end of the Cold War is a prelude to the breakdown of Pax Americana. In his Foreign Policy essay entitled, "The Eagle Has Crash Landed", Wallerstein argues, "The collapse of communism in effect signified the collapse of liberalism, removing the only ideological justification behind US hegemony, a justification tacitly supported by liberalism's ostensible ideological opponent".[87]

End of the Space Race

[edit]

Following the end of ideological confrontation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the political motivations that had sustained large-scale space competition largely disappeared. Although both the United States and Russia continued space activity, ambitious exploration programs declined as governments prioritized domestic economic concerns and no longer viewed spaceflight as a primary measure of global prestige.[88]

[edit]
Ethiopian tanks pass a Communist memorial in Addis Ababa during the Ethiopian Civil War, 1991.

1985

[edit]

1986

[edit]

1987

[edit]

1988

[edit]

1989

[edit]

1990

[edit]

1991

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ For more on the earlier manifestations of De-Stalinization, see Tony Judt's Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945[2]
  2. ^ See for instance: Janne E. Nolan, "The INF Treaty: Eliminating Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles, 1987 to the Present," and Dan Caldwell, "From SALT to START: Limiting Strategic Nuclear Weapons," in Encyclopedia of Arms Control, pp. 955–965 and pp. 895–913.
  3. ^ Also see: Thomas Roser: DDR-Massenflucht: Ein Picknick hebt die Welt aus den Angeln (German - Mass exodus of the GDR: A picnic clears the world) in: Die Presse 16 August 2018. More can be viewed in: „Der 19. August 1989 war ein Test für Gorbatschows“ (German - August 19, 1989 was a test for Gorbachev), or see: FAZ 19 August 2009. Miklós Németh in Interview, Austrian TV - ORF "Report", 25 June 2019.

Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ Walker 1995, pp. 278–283.
  2. ^ Judt 2005, pp. 311–312, 436–437.
  3. ^ Jarausch 2015, pp. 659–663.
  4. ^ Walker 1995, pp. 287–288.
  5. ^ a b Westad 2017, p. 523.
  6. ^ Podvig 2017, pp. 8–15.
  7. ^ Lambeth & Lewis 1988, pp. 755–770.
  8. ^ Walker 1995, pp. 292, 300, 308.
  9. ^ Davis 1988, pp. 720–734.
  10. ^ CQ Press 2012, pp. 252–253.
  11. ^ Rustow 1977, pp. 494–516.
  12. ^ Wilson 2018, pp. 552–555.
  13. ^ a b Roberts 1996, p. 554.
  14. ^ a b Judt 2005, p. 600.
  15. ^ Mania 2024, pp. 41–63.
  16. ^ Howell 2008, pp. 389–415.
  17. ^ Judt 2005, pp. 592–593.
  18. ^ Jarausch 2015, pp. 659–662.
  19. ^ Hitchcock 2003, p. 240.
  20. ^ Howell 2008, pp. 394–409.
  21. ^ Westad 2017, p. 546.
  22. ^ Robinson 2007.
  23. ^ Leebaert 2003, p. 595.
  24. ^ Leffler 2004, pp. 79–80.
  25. ^ Paczkowski 2004, pp. 489–494.
  26. ^ Gaddis 2005, pp. 218–219, 241.
  27. ^ Gaddis 2005, pp. 185, 218–222.
  28. ^ Kramer 2003, pp. 212–215.
  29. ^ Kramer 2003, pp. 215–219.
  30. ^ Sarotte 2014, pp. 56–60.
  31. ^ Sarotte 2014, pp. 60–64.
  32. ^ Sarotte 2014, pp. 71–77.
  33. ^ Frank 2009.
  34. ^ Gaddis 2005, pp. 247–248.
  35. ^ Kramer 2003, pp. 222–231.
  36. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 590–599.
  37. ^ Kramer 2003, pp. 178–256.
  38. ^ Csongos 1989.
  39. ^ Sarotte 2014, pp. 78–83.
  40. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 599–616.
  41. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 600–601.
  42. ^ Filippov, Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1999, pp. 3–26.
  43. ^ Plokhy 2014, pp. 298–304.
  44. ^ Plokhy 2014, pp. 304–309.
  45. ^ Plokhy 2014, pp. 321–329.
  46. ^ Plokhy 2014, pp. 333–336.
  47. ^ Walker 1995, pp. 310–313.
  48. ^ Gaddis 2005, pp. 249–251.
  49. ^ Walker 1995, pp. 340, 346.
  50. ^ BBC News 1989.
  51. ^ Gaddis 2005, pp. 235, 254–255.
  52. ^ Mathews & McCormack 1995, pp. 93–107.
  53. ^ United Nations Security Council 1990.
  54. ^ Weston 1991, pp. 516–535.
  55. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 530–563.
  56. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 555–563.
  57. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 558–562.
  58. ^ Gaddis 2005, pp. 268–270.
  59. ^ Cohen 2011.
  60. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 585, 596–597.
  61. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 596–599.
  62. ^ Bohlen 1991.
  63. ^ Jarausch 2019, pp. 192–194.
  64. ^ Marshall 1993.
  65. ^ Jarausch 2015, p. 401.
  66. ^ Jarausch 2015, pp. 468–469.
  67. ^ Jarausch 2015, p. 478.
  68. ^ a b Jarausch 2015, p. 662.
  69. ^ Jarausch 2015, pp. 664–665.
  70. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 618–624.
  71. ^ Brands 2008, p. 3.
  72. ^ Walker 2011, pp. 281–284.
  73. ^ Jarausch 2019, pp. 9–13.
  74. ^ Bartel 2021, pp. 27–44.
  75. ^ Jarausch 2019, pp. 14–18.
  76. ^ Jervis 2021, pp. 115–131.
  77. ^ Radchenko 2021, pp. 45–61.
  78. ^ English 2002, pp. 70–75, 85–90.
  79. ^ Jarausch 2019, pp. 185–189.
  80. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 621–624.
  81. ^ Levitsky & Way 2010, p. 15.
  82. ^ Moravcsik & Vachudova 2002, pp. 1–2.
  83. ^ Roland 2002, pp. 29–30.
  84. ^ Hitchcock 2003, pp. 452–459.
  85. ^ Hitchcock 2003, pp. 458–464.
  86. ^ Westad 2017, pp. 566–570.
  87. ^ Wallerstein 2002.
  88. ^ Moltz 2019, pp. 18–20.
  89. ^ Ronald Reagan Presidential Library & Museum 1986.
  90. ^ U.S. Department of State 2026.
  91. ^ Sancton 1988.
  92. ^ Hitchcock 2003, p. 367.

Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
  • Ball, S. J. The Cold War: An International History, 1947–1991 (1998). British perspective
  • Beschloss, Michael, and Strobe Talbott. At the Highest Levels:The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (1993)
  • Braithwaite, Rodric et al. "Could the Soviet Union Have Survived? We ask four historians whether the demise of one of the 20th century's superpowers was as inevitable as it now seems." History Today (Oct 2020) 70#10 pp 8–10 [online].
  • Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. "Power, globalization, and the end of the Cold War: Reevaluating a landmark case for ideas." International Security 25.3 (2001): 5-53. [online]
  • Engel, Jeffrey A. When the World Seemed New: George H. W. Bush and the End of the Cold War (2017)
  • Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (1992) online
  • Garthoff, Raymond. The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (1994) online
  • Goertz, Gary and Jack S. Levy, eds. Causal explanations, necessary conditions, and case studies: World War I and the End of the Cold War (2005), 10 essays from political scientists; online
  • Hogan, Michael, ed. The End of the Cold War. Its Meaning and Implications (1992) articles from Diplomatic History
  • Kalinovsky, Artemy M. "New Histories of the End of the Cold War and the Late Twentieth Century." Contemporary European History 27.1 (2018): 149–161. online
  • Kegley Jr, Charles W. "How did the cold war die? Principles for an autopsy." Mershon International Studies Review 38.Supplement_1 (1994): 11–41.
  • Kenney, Padraic. 1989: Democratic Revolutions at the Cold War's End: A Brief History with Documents (2009) covers Poland, the Philippines, Chile, South Africa, Ukraine, and China
  • Leffler, Melvyn P. For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (2007) pp 338–450.
  • Mann, James. The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (2010). popular
  • Matlock, Jack F. Autopsy on an Empire (1995) online by US ambassador to Moscow
  • Matlock, Jack F. Reagan and Gorbachev : how the Cold War ended (2004) online
  • Powaski, Ronald E. The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917–1991 (1998)
  • Romero, Federico. "Cold War historiography at the crossroads." Cold War History 14.4 (2014): 685–703. online
  • Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (1993), a primary source
  • Wilson, James Graham. The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War (2014)
  • Wohlforth, William C. "Realism and the End of the Cold War." International Security 19.3 (1994): 91–129. online
  • Zubok, Vladislav M. "Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: Perspectives on History and Personality," Cold War History (2002) 2:2, 61–100, DOI: 10.1080/713999954
  • Zubok, Vladislav M. A failed empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (2009). online
[edit]

This article is sourced from Wikipedia. Content is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License.